Abstract. In this paper we consider the security of the Misty structure in the Luby-Rackoff model, if the inner functions are replaced by involutions without fixed point. In this context we show that the success probability in distinguishing a 4-round L-scheme from a random function is O(m 2 /2 n ) (where m is the number of queries and 2n the block size) when the adversary is allowed to make adaptively chosen encryption queries. We give a similar bound in the case of the 3-round R-scheme. Finally, we show that the advantage in distinguishing a 5-round scheme from a random permutation when the adversary is allowed to adaptively chosen encryption as well as decryption queries is also O(m 2 /2 n ). This is to our knowledge the first time involutions are considered in the context of the Luby-Rackoff model.
A security proof in the Luby-Rackoff model consists in upper bounding this advantage (as a function of the number of queries m and the block size 2n) for all possible distinguishers A. If for n big enough, and for all distinguishing algorithms A of which the number of queries m is polynomial in n, Adv A is polynomially small, then Φ is said to be pseudorandom. If this criteria still holds when decryption queries are allowed as well, then Φ is said to be superpseudorandom. As a shortcut, an algorithm allowed to make adaptative encryption queries only will often be called pseudorandom distinguisher, and an algorithm allowed to make both adaptative encryption and adaptative decryption queries will be called superpseudorandom distinguisher.
Luby and Rackoff's paper initiated a significant amount of research in the area: in 1992 Patarin [11, 12] made explicit the link between the advantage and the transition probability associated with a given structure Φ (see section 2.3); this gives a practical way of upper bounding the advantage. The same year, Maurer showed how to generalise undistinguishability results to locally random functions. More recently, Ramzan and Reyzin introduced a new model which assumes that the attacker has oracle access to some of the round functions [16] . Besides, the Feistel structure (first examined by Luby and Rackoff) was widely studied. On the one hand, its security bounds were tried to be improved [11, 13, 14, 15] . On the other hand, slightly modified constructions were examined: constructions were some of the round functions are identical [12] , or are replaced by hash functions for example [5, 10] . Moreover some other constructions were also examined [9, 19] .
Recently, constructions used in the block ciphers Misty [6] and Kasumi were examined. In 1997, Sakurai and Zheng [17] presented several negative results (i.e. non-pseudorandomness and non-superpseudorandomness) on these schemes. Then Gilbert and Minier [8] showed in 2001 that the 4-round Misty construction (called L-scheme) is pseudorandom, while 3 rounds of its inverse (called R-scheme) is sufficient to obtain pseudorandomness. Moreover they showed that 5 rounds of these constructions are necessary to obtain superpseudorandomness. The same year, Iwata et al. [3] showed that some of the 5 inner permutations can be replaced by uniform -XOR universal permutations without losing superpseudorandomness; moreover, following the model of Ramzan and Reyzin [16] , they show that oracle access to some specific inner permutations does not change superpseudorandomness either. Finally, the next year about the same authors showed that the second inner permutation of a 5-round Misty does not need to be cryptographic at all to guarantee superpseudorandomness: it can be a constant and public transformation g, provided
In this paper, we consider another restriction on the inner functions: namely, we assume that all of them are random involutions (i.e. permutations c such that ∀x : c(c(x)) = x) without fixed point. For implementation reasons, involutions were a basis of the design of several recent block ciphers (see e.g. Khazad [1] , Anubis, Noekeon, ICEBERG [18] ), hence the interest of such hypothesis. We show that the pseudorandom character of Misty constructions is preserved under this constraint (the number of rounds considered remaining unchanged).
Preliminaries.

2.1
The Misty L-and R-Schemes.
We describe two basic schemes: the L-scheme has been used in the Misty [6] and Kasumi block ciphers, the R-scheme is almost its inverse (we follow the terminology used by Gilbert and Minier [8] ). We define a 1-round L-scheme as a 2n-bit permutation ψ L taking a n-bit permutation c as a round function and such that:
It is depicted in Figure 1 . An r-round L-scheme is simply the composition of r 1-round L-schemes, transforming r n-bit permutations c 1 , ..., c r into a 2n-bit permutation:
A 1-round R-scheme transforms a n-bit permutation c into a 2n-bit permutation ψ R (c) too. It is defined as (see Figure 1 ):
The composition of r 1-round R-schemes is a r-round R-scheme:
In this paper we consider variants of the ψ L and ψ R schemes, where the last XOR operation is omitted, as well as the last swap. We call them ψ L and ψ R . Throughout this paper we use the following notations:
-I n denotes the {0, 1} n set.
-I := I m n (where m is the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs considered).
-For X, Y ∈ I: X ∼ Y informally means that X and Y could be the inputs and outputs of a permutation. More formally: ∀i, j ∈ [1...m] :
-f * always denotes a perfect random function (or permutation, or involution without fixed point, depending on the context), i.e. one which is chosen in accordance with the uniform probability distribution.
Patarin's Coefficient H Technique.
Let P (L,R) (S,T) be the probability for a structure Φ(f 1 , ..., f r ) to be such that
. Not surprisingly, this probability plays a big role in upper bounding the advantage an algorithm A has in distinguishing Φ from a perfect random function F * . The link between P (L,R) (S,T) and the best advantage has been quantified by Patarin [11, 12] 
Then for any distinguisher A using m encryption queries
Theorem 1 deals with pseudorandom distinguishers. A similar theorem holds for superpseudorandom distinguishers: Theorem 2 (Patarin). Let C : I 2n → I 2n be a random permutation; let C * : I 2n → I 2n be a perfect random permutation. Let m be an integer, and
The 4-Round L-Scheme.
We consider a 4-round L-scheme were the inner permutations c * 1 , ..., c * 4 are perfect random involutions without fixed point. In section 4 we will prove the following lemma:
Then the probability for a 4-uple 
is pseudorandom, and secure as long as m 2 n/2 .
Proof. It is an immediate application of theorem 1. The constraint T ∈ I = in lemma 1 implies a non-zero 1 . More precisely, 1 is equal to the probability for a (perfect) random T ∈ I to belong to I = . It can be shown to be smaller than
2·2 n :
Lemma 1 gives the corresponding 2 .
4 Proof of Lemma 1. be the probability that a random 4-uple (
We consider the following conditions (C) on (A, B):
Then equation (1) implies:
The number of A such that (C1) is satisfied is
For a (perfect) random such A we have:
Consider given 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m, and assume L i = L j and R i = R j . As there are (2 n −m+λ)(2 n −m+λ−1) possible values for (A i , A j ) satisfying (C 1 ), among which 2 n − m + λ satisfy A i = A j , we get
Similarly, the number of B such that (C2) is satisfied is
2 n . Finally for a (perfect) random (A, B) we compute:
2 n Thus the number of (A, B) ∈ I = satisfying (C) can be lower bounded by:
Under these conditions on (A, B) we can evaluate
Pr[(c 1 (L)⊕R = A)]·Pr[c 2 (R)⊕A = B]·Pr[c 3 (A)⊕B = S]·Pr[c 4 (B) = T]
and we obtain:
After multiplication of (7) by the number of terms (6):
By lower bounding the products, this expression can be shown to be greater or equal than:
It is easy to show that (8) is greater or equal than:
By evaluating the first factor using the binomial theorem, we can show
Finally, immediate calculations show that (9) is greater or equal than:
which concludes the proof.
The 3-Round R-Scheme.
A result similar to theorem 3 can be proved for a 3-round R-scheme: 
The 5-Round Scheme.
The following lemma is proved in the next section: 
Using theorem 2, it implies superpseudorandomness for a 5-round scheme:
.., c * 5 be independent perfect random involutions without fixed point of I n . Let C * be a perfect random permutation of
. Then for any superpseudorandom distinguisher A allowed to make m queries:
is superpseudorandom, and secure as long as m 2 n/2 .
The proof of lemma 2 will require the following lemma. Proving it is easy, it is why we do not give the proof here. Lemma 3. Let x, y ∈ I n , 0 = ∆ ∈ I n . The probability for a random involution without fixed point c to satisfy
Proof of Lemma 2.
We use the intermediate states A := c 1 (L)⊕R, B := c 2 (R)⊕A and C := c 3 (A) ⊕ B (see Figure 3 ). Let P (L,R) (S,T) be the probability that a random 5-
We define the following three conditions (C) on (A, B, C):
We first evaluate the inner sum for given A, B ∈ I = satisfying (C1). Adding constraints C ∼ S, C ⊕ T ∈ I = and B ⊕ C ∈ I = only removes zero terms from the sum. Thus it is equal to:
It is easy to see that |{C ∈ I : C ∼ S ∧ (C 3 )}| = (2 n −m+σ)! (2 n −2m+2σ)! . Moreover we compute:
We evaluate the first sum. For given 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m, if S i = S j and T i = T j , then the probability is smaller than
The second sum can be bounded similarly. We now consider the third sum. Let 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m. As there are 2 n − m + σ possible values of C j satisfying C ∼ S and (C 3 ), we obtain Pr[
The fourth sum can be bounded similarly. Putting these inequalities together, we finally get
The probabilities in (14) are easy to evaluate. Thus (14) is lower bounded by:
which is greater or equal than
It remains to evaluate
which is equal to
and the probability is 0. If R i ⊕ R j = 0, we can apply lemma 3. Thus in any case
For shortness, let us denote
The terms of the second sum can be written:
and the first term is 0. Else by lemma 3 it is not greater than 4/2 n . Using lemma 3 again, the second term is also not greater than 4/2 n . The conclusion is that
Finally using (21) and (22), (20) 
which is greater or equal than (see proof of lemma 1)
8 Conclusion and Open Problems.
In this paper we showed that replacing the inner permutations of a Misty structure by involutions without fixed point, without changing the number of rounds, did not significantly affect the previously known security bounds. Several open problems remain: first, one could wonder whether the hypothesis "without fixed point" is important. Intuitively it is clearly not, as taking the inner permutations from a (much) bigger set increases the variety of functions one can generate, and hence the difficulty to distinguish them from perfect random functions.
Also, it is an open question whether in some cases involutions achieve significantly weaker security bounds than permutations. It should be interesting to consider involutions as inner functions of structures different from the Misty ones.
Finally, being able to do security proofs when the inner functions are even more specific (i.e. drawn from a smaller set) than involutions without fixed point would be nice, as it could maybe pave the way to security proofs on structures closer to real-life block ciphers.
